Lewis Hill (attributed)
The War Resistance Memorandum
Internal Pacifica circular; circa Autumn 1948-Winter 1949
FBI document SF 100-43693, I344-338


"This project was begun as an attempt to carry a radical war resistance program into a mass medium. The original conception of programming was not naïve with respect to what can be done at once in propagandizing for war resistance. It was recognized that the confidence of a large audience must be gained first, to make possible a more and more intensive cultivation of the interests of common people in resisting war, and to create a stable institutional basis for integrating this interest not only through radio programing [sic] but, as that work progressed, through supplementary activities of a revolutionary nature. The formula conceived at the outset was that mass education for war resistance would take place in direct proportion to the radio station's growth in stature as a source of non-ideological entertainment and artistic activity. We were willing to take the 'long view' in working out the plan, recognizing the necessity of first establishing a legal operation and so forth; but it was always a part of the conception that this station was not only not an end in itself but would be sacrificed in toto, immediately, when the circumstances arose in which its sacrifice could achieve a greater impact on the public consciousness than could its continuance as a compromised and censored voice. The original thinking envisioned more or less definitely and as a matter of course an eventual crisis of this sort. Our whole project was a war-resistance weapon and nothing else, to be used as long as its usefulness for that purpose was definite, to be sacrificed with maximum notoriety possible when it could no longer be used for that purpose.

It was recognized at the outset that there are only very limited circles in which support could be gained for capitalizing the station if its purpose were represented in the traditional terminology of war resistance. It was obvious to us, first, that such purposes could be sublimated as an interest in Peace in various ways, and could thus be made a part of the public representation without too much danger; secondly, it was perfectly apparent that the project inherently possessed other, incidental attributes which could be given prominence in the representations (better radio programming as such) and also in the actual operation of the station, to enlarge the entire basis of appeal. Our prospectuses always contained exactly these elements-war resistance exprssed [sic] very generally as a dedicated concern with Peace; and a broader appeal based on the widely appreciated need for better radio programming. On the other hand, despite the generality of even this appeal, we know also that the ultimate limit of the circle in which we could honestly and safely look for money lay somewhere among the more enlightened and disillusioned liberals. Perhaps our general feeling on this subject was that while we didn't at all insist on dealing only with persons who shared a war-resistance ideology, we wanted anyone who took a serious interest and made a serious contribution to understand that we had that ideology, and to be of the temperament and philosophy that would not be alarmed or alienated by it. We have always looked upon our prospectuses as a minimal guarantee that there could be no gross misunderstanding along these lines.

So far as the purpose of the project among ourselves is concerned, we have had to proceed, naturally, as though in every respect our aim were to establish a permanent community institution. In our countless dealings with officials and the professional people whose help we required we have been compelled to develop a kind of double personality about the project, speaking of it and doing its work as though it were something which might well be fitted for favorable comment in a [San Francisco] Chronicle editorial [italics added]. In short, in its total representation to the government and our professional assistants, the project has appeared as a purely 'liberal' undertaking within the code of governmental liberalism. In our private meetings we have been inevitably occupied month after month by the very subject matter of these representations; our talk has centered mainly on them. As a result, in place of our original ambivalence toward the institutionalization of the project (the vehicle of an institution was needed, and was quite desirable so long as it did not water down the radical purpose; but the habits of institutional thinking were to be avoided) we have now an increasing tendency to think from problem to problem in terms of the problem itself in an institutional perspective than in terms of all such problems in a radical perspective.

At the same time, our fund-raising activities have brought us into an extremely uneasy relationship with certain liberal elements, and our tendency, naturally, is to move on in a direction which will tend to lessen the uneasiness of the relationship. Fortunately we have no obtained actual contributions from these quarters, or no substantial amounts in any event, but we have compromised ourselves by accepting the assistance of active ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] personnel in getting to our most substantial contributions. The aspects of the project which were incidental to its main purpose-concerns with race relations, with the labor movement, against the commies, etc.-have in these quarters been permitted to represent the project almost entirely, to the exclusion of the main purpose; to the end that the ADA in California, knowing it has led us to a major part of our funds, looks toward KPFA as a close ally with a virtually identical program. We have acquired obligations to the kind of liberals who are not at all disillusioned but are busy preparing for war with Russia, recently discovered to be the new look in 'fascism.'

We are now about to engage in our first direct mail campaign, in which it has been suggested that a list of distinguished 'sponsors' be used to pep up the response. The names under consideration for membership on our sponsoring committee include Meiklejohn, Deutsche [sic], Orr [?], Condliffe, Cross. It has been suggested that Monroe Deutsche be sought as the head of such a committee, to sign the letter of appeal. We proposed to send out to a list of 20,000, if possible, a brochure describing the project more or less as our prospectuses have in the past , but much more briefly and with a straight advertising slant; accompanied by a letter of commendation and appeal signed by Monroe Deutsche and sponsored by the Mayor of Berkeley, by the head of the Humanist Fellowship, and by one of the country's outstanding liblabs, among others. It is not known that any of these persons has the slightest sympathy with the conception of war resistance. In all probability each of them would be horrified by the thought of it. With racial equality, however, and with furtherance of the labor movement, and better programming for children and other aspects of the project which were incidental to the main purpose, these persons can be assumed to have a deep sympathy. Presumably if we wish to obtain their sponsorship we will emphasize these incidental purposes, will state that we are also concerned with peace, and will say nothing about war resistance.

But when we have used such persons for such a purpose, we will have taken on a community obligatiob [sic]; we will be morally bound to the understanding of the project given these persons in order to get their support; we will have to agree to their continual scrutiny, if not admit them to membership, in order to get it; and we will be committed to the meaning of their sponsorship among the public. If we take this course it is therefore clear that our project can be publicly misrepresented on this grand scale at its outset and still be carried through as a radical war resistance program; or we have watered down its purposes, and are now really moving into something which we imagine Meiklejohm [sic] Deutsche and the others will find, on the whole, quite acceptable in the coming times of crisis.

Nothing of the sort, of course, has been formulated in our meetings, and there is no issue of this sort before us at the moment. We are moving along smoothly on the best course we see.

If the project has been watered down unconsciously in our months of furthering it, it should be abandoned by those are interested only in the original purpose, and interest in the incidental purposes only as they can contribute to the achievement of the original purpose. Whether or not the project has been watered down in any serious sense can be determined by the question whether we consider it something that could ever prove, in actual operations, acceptable to the likes of Deutsche and the others proposed for sponsorship.

If the project has been watered down, no idea should be entertained of seeking or accepting the sponsorship of these persons, or of representing the project in a manner which might lead to the general assumption that it would be suitable for such sponsorship. In the basic technique of the project we are admitted compelled to deal with the tension between the 'long range' educational concepts, which admit of some temporizing in order to gain confidence and drive an entering wedge, and ideology purity, so much demanded of us if the project is actually to escape the ordinary end of causes when they are institutionalized. On the one hand we must be entirely 'practical' in what we are doing, and on the other hand we must remain dominantly and hard-headedly idealistic in every promulgation of policy. But being 'practical' about mass education for war resistance does not mean hoodwinking certain eminent persons into sponsorship of the project by its basic misrepresentation, in the hope that later one, when we actually have the station, we can forget we had anything to do with them. Nor does it mean, especially, hoodwinking ourselves as to the inevitable consequences of such a step in terms of the project's obtain and its ability to attain it.

At the beginning we felt that the success or failure of the project in financial terms would depend upon the response we found among pacifists throughout the country. It was not a foregone conclusion that all of these prospects were already known [sic] to the money-raisers of pacifist organizations. Our early experience confirmed our belief in the instance of Mrs. Day particularly, who was unknown to the FOR, AFSC and other circuits and yet had the deepest sympathy for what we wanted to do. We have clearly established the fact that there are scattered around the country the persons we supposed, with large amounts of money and a general ideological relevance to the basic purpose of the project; but we have failed to persuade enough of these persons to part with their money. At the same time we have failed to enlist the active temporary aid of the recognized pacifist channels. Our initial conception of fund-raising, therefore, has not worked out, but not because the possibility we originally envisioned does not exist. Our experience proves that the original conception of fundraising was correct, insofar as the original and basic purpose of the project is to be preserved.

The hope for the project's success should still rest in the possibility of finding contributors among the ideologically relevant, by whatever means of contact. Here our major representations will center, as they have in the past, and the project will have its only responsibility to subsequent criticism. We have in the past supposed that our ill success in certain quarters would be relieved when a grant from the FCC [Federal Communications Comission] was actually received, but this belief was not borne out in our May-June 1948 campaign (although the campaign was too brief to provide definite evidence of anything). The only remaining factor in our grasp that might alter our experience with such contributors is tax exemption, and it thus appears that the basic success of the project's fund raising depends upon the outcome of our tax exemption case.

Meantime we are wholly justified in conducting any direct mail consistent with our purpose which is likely to realize a net increase of our capital by even a few thousand dollars. But we cannot orient the project to a complete dependence upon this method of fund raising; we cannot place our ultimate hopes there."


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